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THE WIDOW'S ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA: IS SHE
A PURCHASER OR A BENEFICIARY?
The doctrine of "election" originated in equity and is applied
whenever a person must make a choice between inconsistent rights.1
As applied to wills, the doctrine generally comes into play when a hus-
band has made a specific bequest to his widow, but has expressly pro-
vided in his will that the widow must relinquish any other claims in his
estate-dower, for example, or statutory "forced share" in lieu of dower
-in order to take the bequest under the will.2 The widow is thus put
to her election: she must either take the bequest under the will or claim
her statutory share of her husband's estate. 3
The application of the equitable doctrine of election in community
property states has been termed an "anomaly in the law of community
property."4  Nevertheless, it was applied quite early by the California
courts5 and continues to be an important factor in estate planning.6
In Gist v. United States t a recent income tax case arising in Cali-
fornia, the will of the deceased husband provided that the entire com-
munity property (including the widow's share) was to be transferred to
a trust. The income from the trust was to be paid to the widow for
life, thereafter to the testator's children from a previous marriage for
1. 5 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 47.1 at 594 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1962); AT-
KINSON ON WILLS § 138, at 767 (2d ed. 1953); G. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 471, at 685 (3d ed. 1947).
2. 5 PAGE, supra note 1, § 47.7, at 610.
3. Id. § 47.11, at 616; G. THOMPSON, supra note 1, § 475 at 691; Brown &
Brown, The Widow's Election, 43 CAL. ST. B.J. 343 (1968): "The typical case, however
is that of a couple whose assets are entirely community property, both halves of which
the husband by his will purports to transfer to a trust, from which the income is to be
paid to the widow for life and the principal distributed on her death to the children. The
widow is thus put to an election, either to take a life estate in the entire community
property or to retain her full ownership of one half, in which event her husband's half
will pass outright to the children. . . ." Id.
4. 1 W. DE FuNIAIK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNrrY PROPERTY § 217, at 616 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as DE FUNAKI.
5. See, e.g., Morrison v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 337 (1865).
6. See Halbach, The Community Property "Widow's Election" and Some of its
Surprise Counterparts, 107 TRuSTS & ESTATES 108 (1968); Miller, The Measured
Voluntary Survivor's Election: A Planning Technique for Both Separate Property and
Community Property Estates, 19 U. So. CAL. 1967 TAx INsT. 549; Schwartz and
Liker, The Widow's Election, 1 MIAMI ESTATE TAX INST. 67-10 (1967).
7. 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970), affg 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1969),
noted in 3 U. SAN FRANcIsco L. REv. 346 (1969) and 3 MIAMI ESTATE PLANNING
INT. ff 69-103 (1969).
their respective lives, and the corpus thereafter distributed equally to
their issue.
The will contained certain other provisions for the widow. Insofar
as the community property was concerned, however, the will provided
that the widow would have to elect whether to take the life income from
the entire property under the terms of the trust established in the will,
or to retain her separate community interest. In the event the widow
elected to retain her share of the community property, the decedent's
share of the community property was to go to the trust under the terms
of the will as though the widow had predeceased her husband.
The widow filed her election to take under the will. The will was
admitted to probate and approved in 1961.
The widow subsequently brought an action in the federal district
court for refund of federal income taxes paid for the taxable years 1962,
1963 and 1964. Her election to take under her husband's will, the
plaintiff argued, constituted a purchase of a life estate; she therefore
claimed an income tax deduction for the amortization of the cost basis
of this life estate." The basic issue in the case was summarized by the
court as follows:
The Commissioner took the position that Mrs. Gist had acquired
her interest by bequest from her husband's testamentary disposi-
tion of his property. Mrs. Gist contended that she had purchased
her interest by giving up fully vested rights in her half of the com-
munity property. Therefore, she had not acquired her interest by
"gift, bequest, or inheritance" and was not within the coverage of
[section 273 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954].9
8. The trust corpus consisted of assets totalling $575,357; the widow's property
of $343,083; and the husband's property of $232,274. The "present value" of the trust
income which would be received by the widow during her life was computed to be
$144,179 through the use of actuarial tables. The widow had originally contended that
the "cost" of the life estate was the total of what she would receive from the trust, i.e.,
$144,179. The court, however, held that she would be allowed to amortize only that
portion of the income attributable to her husband's share of the property in the trust,
and this was computed to be $58,205 utilizing actuarial tables set forth in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.72-9 (1957). 296 F. Supp. at 528-29.
9. 423 F.2d at 1120. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 273 provides: "Amounts paid
under the laws of a State, a Territory, the District of Columbia, a possession of the
United States, or a foreign country as income to the holder of a life or terminable in-
terest acquired by gift, bequest, or inheritance shall not be reduced or diminished by
any deduction for shrinkage (by whatever name called) in the value of such interest due
to the lapse of time." This section has remained virtually unchanged since it was origi-
nally incorporated into the Revenue Bill of 1921; the following reasons were given for
its passage: "Under existing laws persons receiving by gift, bequest, devise, or inheri-
tance a life or other terminable interest in property, frequently capitalize the expected
future income, set up the value of this expectation as corpus or principal, and thereafter
claim a deduction for exhaustion of this so-called principal on the ground that with the
passage of time the 'principal' or corpus is gradually shrinking or wasting. This section
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The district court held the election constituted a "purchase," and
accordingly allowed an amortization deduction for the "cost basis" of
the life estate in the husband's share of the community property. 10 On
appeal by the Commissioner to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the court noted that "the precise question is one of first impres-
sion," '" but affirmed the judgment.
Unless the widow is recognized as a "purchaser" of the life in-
terest she received under the terms of the will, amortization would not
be allowed under the income tax laws. In the Gist case the court dis-
cussed the effect of the widow's election for purposes of the federal es-
tate and gift taxes, and apparently arrived at conclusions of taxability
under income tax law on the basis of prior decisions involving estate and
gift taxes. This Note will discuss: (1) the California law relating to
the effect of the widow's election on community property; (2) the ap-
plicability of the gift tax cases to the income tax considerations in the
Gist case; and (3) income tax cases involving the widow's election.
The discussion will indicate that the court in the Gist case erred in
concluding that the widow was a "purchaser" of the bequest she re-
ceived under the terms of her husband's will.
Community Property Law in California
And the Widow's Election
Prior to 1927, the wife's rights in community property in Cali-
fornia were held to be a "mere expectancy," similar in some respects
to dower.' 2 But since 1927, a husband and wife are deemed to have
"present, existing, and equal' 81 interests in community property during
explicitly provides that no such deduction shall be recognized." H.R. REP. No. 350,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921).
10. Gist v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 526 (N.D. Cal. 1969). Amortization is
an annual deduction permitted by law to enable taxpayers to recover the cost of an
income producing intangible asset over its useful life. The Commissioner has allowed
an amortization deduction to the remainderman of a trust who purchases the interest of
a life beneficiary of the trust, the corpus of which consists of corporate stock; the cost
is recovered by ratable annual deductions over the period of beneficiary's life expec-
tancy in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.167(g)-1 (1-64). Commissioner v. Fry, 283
F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1960); Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954). The
Commissioner had previously contended that the purchased life interest became merged
with the remainder interest, and that the cost of the purchased life interest should be
added to the "cost basis" of the remainder interest and recouped at the time of sale or
other disposition of the stock. The Commissioner has now acquiesced with the view that
the purchase cost may be amortized over the remaining life of the beneficiary. Rev. Rul.
132, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 73. Application of this Revenue Ruling to the circumstances in
the Gist case is highly questionable. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
11. 432 F.2d at 1120.
12. 1 DnE FuNu, supra note 4, § 217 at 619,
13. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105.
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the continuance of the marriage relation, with the management and
control thereof, with few exceptions, in the husband."a Upon the death
of either spouse, one-half of the community property is subject to the
testamentary disposition of the decedent and in the absence of such
disposition, the decedent's interest goes to the surviving spouse.1 5 An
unauthorized gift of community property by the husband may be set
aside in its entirety by the wife during his lifetime, but upon his death
she can only recover her half share of the property. 16
The application of the equitable doctrine of the widow's election
to community property interests disposed of by a deceased husband's
will has been criticized on the basis that since the widow's share of the
community property is already owned outright by her and cannot be
affected by the husband's will, the widow is not faced with an election
by virtue of an attempted testamentary disposition of her property by
the decedent.17  This criticism is apparently based on the premise that
the doctrine of election can only be applied when the decedent hus-
band owns all the marital property and that the only purpose of a wid-
ow's election is to determine which portion of the husband's estate she
will take-the bequest under his will or her statutory share of his es-
tate." This is not always true, however, since any attempted testamen-
tary disposition of property belonging to another gives rise to an
election when it is conditioned upon a specific bequest to such person
of the testator's own property. 19 As to circumstances requiring an elec-
tion, the California Supreme Court has stated:
If the testator purported to dispose of both his and his spouse's
share of the community property, and it appears that the intent of
the testator will be thwarted by giving literal effect to the will
while recognizing the community property rights of the surviving
spouse, an election should be required.20
14. Id. §§ 5124-25.
15. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201-03.
16. Tyre v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 2d 399, 353 P.2d 725, 6 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1960); accord United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1959) (dictum).
17. 1 DE FUNIAK, supra note 4, § 217, at 616-18: "The doctrine of election by the
wife which has developed in some of the community property states . . . is an anomaly
in the law of community property. . .. [I]t was borrowed from the common law
as it relates to widow's dower rights and engrafted onto the community property sys-
tem. . . . [In California) the frequent misinterpretation of the principles of com-
munity property and the frequent attempt to explain them by the use of common law
concepts led to numerous decisions which declared that 'community property' was ac-
tually owned by the husband and that the wife had merely an expectant interest in half
of that property which vested in her at the husband's death." Id. at 616-19.
18. See id.
19. See authorities cited note 1 supra; accord, In re Estate of Cecala, 104 Cal.
App. 2d 526, 530, 232 P.2d 48, 51 (1951); CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.7.
20. Estate of Wolfe, 48 Cal. 2d 570, 575, 311 P.2d 476, 478 (1957).
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The California court has historically viewed the election as an "all
or nothing " technique; 21 a widow having the right of election may
either take under the will or may retain her community interest in the
property, but she cannot do both. This view is based on the theory that
her election to take under the will constitutes a waiver of her com-
munity interest.22
In an early case,2 8 the California court likened the effect of the
widow's election to "a contract or an estopper' and stated:
The-will and the waiver must be considered together, and we think
they are contractual in their nature. ... . While the instrument
attached to this will was a waiver, it was also both a consent and
agreement .... 24
The court concluded that the wife would be "estopped" from denying
the validity of the agreement since she had made her election to take un-
der her husband's will.
There is general agreement that under California law the only
purpose of a widow's election is to adjust the distribution of the property
under the will to conform to the testator's express or implied intention.25
What then was the intention of the husband in the Gist case? The terms
of the will provided as follows:
It is my intention to dispose of my entire separate estate, if any,
and the entire community property including my wife's share
thereof [the entire community property to go to a trust for the
benefit of the wife and children].2
Even though the decedent's will provided for transfer of the entire
community property to a trust, the California court has held that such
unauthorized transfer of the wife's separate and distinct interest in the
21. In re Estate of Vogt, 154 Cal. 508, 98 P. 265 (1908); In re Estate of Roach,
176 Cal. App. 2d 547, 1 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1959).
22. 5 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WLLS § 47.26 at 644 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1962);
accord, In re Estate of Orwitz, 229 Cal App. 2d 767, 40 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1964); In re
Estate of Roach, 176 Cal. App. 2d 547, 1 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1959); Tassi v. Tassi, 160
Cal. App. 2d 680, 325 P.2d 872 (1958).
23. In re Wyss' Estate, 1-12 Cal. App. 487, 297 P. 100 (1931); accord, DE
FuNux, supra note 4, at 618; 20 CAIjF. L. REY. 217 (1932). But see In re Estate of
Whitney, 171 Cal. 750, 754, 154 P. 855, 857 (1916). Professor Corbin has stated: "It
is universally held that acceptance of the conditional devise or bequest creates an en-
forceable right in the third party to the payment specified by the testator. The accep-
tance of the devise or bequest has the effect of a binding promise, although it is hardly E
promise to the third party and is certainly not a promise to the testator. The third party
need know nothing about it and no communication to him is requisite. It may perhaps
be regarded as a promise to the executor for the benefit of the third party." 4 A. CoRaNn
Com crs § 784, at 90-91 (1951).
24. In re Wyss' Estate, 112 Cal. App. 487, 494, 297 P. 100, 103 (1931).
25. See authorities cited note 22 supra.
26. 296 F. Supp. at 527 (emphasis added).
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community property is revoked and rendered inoperative as a devise or
bequest by the husband.27 The widow's share of the community prop-
erty does not become a part of the husband's taxable estate by virtue
of her election to take under the will.2" The transfer of her share of the
community property to a trust set up by the decedent's will is considered
made by the widow herself, and not by the decedent or his estate.29
The California court has held3" that the widow's election to take
under her husband's will does not entitle her to any preference over the
other legatees in the will.31 This would indicate that under California
law the widow is not deemed to have "purchased" any interest in the
decedent's estate by virtue of her election to take under his will. If the
widow were deemed a purchaser of such interest, she would be entitled
to a preference as a creditor of the husband's estate.
For purposes of federal taxation, it has been held that the status of
property to be taxed is to be determined by reference to state law as con-
strued by the state courts.32 In the Gist" case, the district court relied
on the contractual interpretation of the widow's election to support its
holding that the widow had purchased the bequest under her husband's
will in a "bargained-for sale or exchange made for consideration."34
The court's reasoning appears to have proceeded along the following
lines:
1. If the widow's election is contractual in nature, there must
have been consideration to uphold the contract.
27. Estate of Wolfe, 48 Cal. 2d 570, 311 P.2d 476 (1957); Estate of King, 19 Cal.
2d 354, 121 P.2d 716 (1942); In re Carson's Estate, 234 Cal. App. 2d 516, 44 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1965).
28. Commissioner v. Seigel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957); Coffman-Dobson
Bank & Trust Co., 20 B.T.A. 890 (1930), acquiesced in X-1 CuM. BULL. 13 (1931);
In re Estate of Carson, 234 Cal. App. 2d 516, 44 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1965).
29. See cases cited note 28 supra; accord, Westfall, Estate Planning and the
Widow's Election, 71 HAIw. L. REV. 1269, 1272-74 (1958); Brown & Brown, The
Widow's Election, 43 CAL. ST. B.J. at 343-44 (1968).
30. In re Estate of Chapin, 47 Cal. App. 2d 605, 118 P.2d 499 (1941).
31. "'Contemporaneously with the execution of the will [the wife] executed an in-
strument, annexed to the will, consenting to all the terms of the will and waiving com-
munity property rights to make it effective. Contrary to her contention on this appeal,
her cooperation with her husband in that regard does not warrant any preference be-
yond that provided in the will itself; for although it was an advantage to the testator to
have her waiver, it is apparent that she has already benefited by the trust and will
benefit still further, and she is bound by the terms of the will to which she expressly con-
sented." Id. at 610, 118 P.2d at 502.
32. See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110 (1930) (income tax); Lang v.
Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264, 267 (1937) (estate tax); 35 Op. Arr'y GEN. 265, 266
(1926) (taxability of community income).
33. Gist v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1969), af/'d, 423 F.2d
1118 (9th Cir. 1970).
34. 296 F. Supp. at 528.
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2. The widow relinquished the remainder interest in her share
of the community property in order to obtain the bequest under her
husband's will; therefore this remainder interest in her share may be
regarded as the consideration given by the widow under the contract.
3. The widow's transfer of the remainder interest in her property
to the trust is taxed as a gift, but only to the extent that it exceeds the
value of the bequest which she received from her husband.
4. Therefore, to the extent that the widow's transfer was not a
gift, it must have been a bargained-for sale or exchange made for con-
sideration, that is, a purchase.
The court's reliance on cases involving the effect of the widow's
election for purposes of federal estate and gift taxes35 to sustain its
holding that the widow was a purchaser of the bequest she received un-
der her husband's will and was thus entitled to amortize the "cost" of
the bequest is questionable. The wisdom of such reliance is discussed
in subsequent paragraphs.36
Assuming for the sake of argument the validity of the conclusion
of the Gist court that the widow "purchased" a life interest in the de-
cedent's share of the community property by virtue of her election to
take under his will, the unanswered questions remain: what were the
terms of the transaction and from whom was the "purchase" made?
If the "purchase" were made from the husband's estate, the widow's
share of the community property should have been included in the de-
cedent's taxable estate. However, as previously noted,37 the widow's
share of the community property does not become part of the husband's
gross estate because of her election, and the transfer of the widow's
share of the community property to the trust is considered made by the
widow herself and not by the husband or his estate.
If the widow "purchased" her life interest in the husband's prop-
erty from the trust established in the husband's will, then such transac-
tion could have been completed independently of the husband's will in-
sofar as the widow was concerned. This would not, however, appear to
conform to the underlying premise of the widow's election-that the life
interest in the husband's share of the community property is received by
the widow under the terms of the will.
More importantly, if the widow were a "bona fide purchaser" of
the life estate in her husband's property, and relinquished her share of
the community property as the consideration for such purchase, as
was held by the Gist court, the widow should not have been required to
35. E.g., Commissioner v. Seigel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
36. See text following note 44 infra.
37. See cases cited note 28, supra.
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pay a gift tax on the transaction, and her share of the community prop-
erty should not be included in her gross estate at her death. 8 The fed-
eral estate and gift tax provisions provide that "bona fide, arms length"
transactions are exempt from the gift tax and are not includible in the
transferor's gross estate at death. 9 Since the widow in the Gist case
was required to pay a gift tax on the transfer of her share of the com-
munity property to the trust, and since it is well settled that her share of
the community property will be included in her gross estate at her death,
there would appear to be a basic inconsistency in the holding of the
Gist court that there was a "bona fide purchase" by the widow.
The husband's will expressly provided that the widow would
have to relinguish her entire community property interest in order
to take the bequest of the life interest offered her in the will. The
court, however, held that only a portion of her share of the property
was used to "purchase" the life interest in her husband's share of the
community property. The rest of the widow's property was deemed a
gift in trust to her husband's children. In other words, the court allo-
cated a portion of the widow's community property to the "purchase"
of the life interest in the husband's community property, allowing amor-
tization as to this portion, and held that the rest of the widow's property
transferred to the trust was a gift.
It appears a forced interpretation of the terms of the husband's
will to contend that there was intended a "bargained-for" sale of the
life interest in the husband's share of the community property for only
a portion of the widow's share of the community property. There is
little doubt that the widow, by virtue of her election to take under the
will, was required to relinquish her entire interest in the community
property. The only issue was whether the widow's obligation to relin-
quish her share of the community property changed the character of the
bequest to that of a "purchase" for purposes of amortization under the
income tax laws.
If the bequest were "purchased," no portion of the transfer should
have been considered a gift. Conversely, if the transfer were a gift by
the widow, then there would not be a "bona fide" commercial transaction
for purposes of allowing amortization under the income tax laws. The
court appears to have misconstrued the terms "consideration in money
or money's worth" which are found only in the estate and gift tax pro-
visions, and to have applied them to an income tax case.
For purposes of computing the gift tax liability of the widow on the
transfer of her community property to the trust, the amount of the gift
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2043(a) (estate tax), 2512(b) (gift tax);
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2043-1 (1958) (estate tax), 25.2512-8 (1958) (gift tax).
39. See sources cited note 38 supra.
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is reduced by whatever consideration she receives in exchange for mak-
ing the gift. In other words, only the net value relinquished is taxed as
a gift. The court has apparently interpreted this reduction in the
value of the gift as a "purchase" for purposes of allowing an amortiza-
tion deduction under the income tax laws. There appears to be no
sound basis for this application of the terms "consideration in money or
money's worth" to an income tax case.
The substance of the transaction was a gift by the widow of the re-
mainder interest in her community property and a bequest to the widow
under the terms of the husband's will. The fact that the gift tax is im-
posed on only the net value relinquished by the widow would not seem
sufficient to change the bequest into a "purchase" for purposes of al-
lowing an amortization deduction under the income tax laws.
The Widow's Election and Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes
In the Gist case,40 the widow transferred her share of the com-
munity property valued at $343,083 to the trust, and she received a
life interest in the income from the entire community property (both her
share and her husband's share) in the trust. The computed value of the
life income interest in the trust was $144,179 and the widow paid a gift
tax on the difference of $198,904.41 The widow had originally con-
tended that she should be allowed to amortize $144,179 since this was
the total amount exempted from gift tax liability for the gift of her share
of the community property.42 The court, however, allowed the widow
to amortize only the amount of the life estate attributable to her hus-
band's share of the community property in the trust, which was com-
puted to be worth $58,205, and stated:
To argue that plaintiff sold her half of the community and used the
funds to purchase [the entire income from the trust] places form
over substance. The trust is composed of community property,
therefore, plaintiff already owned one half of the assets prior to its
creation. Plaintiff gave up a remainder in her half and received a
life estate in her husband's half. The amortization deduction
should be computed with reference to the value of the husband's
assets which went into the trust.
[T]here is no reason to import another legal fiction into the
federal tax laws. The objective facts here support defendant's
contention that plaintiff purchased a life estate in the husband's
property while retaining a life estate in her own.43
40. Gist v. United State, 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 433 F.2d
1118 (9th Cir. 1970).
41. 296 F. Supp. at 528.
42. See note 8 supra.
43. 296 F. Supp. at 529.
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To support its holding that the widow had purchased a life estate
in the husband's property, the Gist court cited cases dealing with the ef-
fect of the widow's election for purposes of the federal estate and gift
taxes and stated:
For purposes of the federal estate and gift tax, the exercise of
a widow's election where the estate consists entirely of community
property is considered a bargained-for sale or exchange made for
consideration, i.e., a purchase ...
While no income tax case dealing with a widow's election holds
that the widow can amortize the cost of her life estate . . . it
would be illogical to conclude that she cannot. 44
The federal estate and gift tax provisions45 make a distinction between
transfers which are bona fide, arm's length, non-taxable transactions
and transfers made for inadequate consideration which are taxable, but
for which the amount of the gift to be taxed is reduced to the extent of
any consideration received. The estate and gift tax regulations4 6 pro-
vide that transfers which are bona fide, arm's length transactions are
deemed to be for full and adequate consideration and are thus non-tax-
able transfers. In other words, it is only when the transfer lacks a
bona fide, arm's length, commercial character that the transaction comes
within the estate and gift tax provisions. For exanple, the gift tax reg-
ulations provide:
Transfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those only
which, being without a valuable consideration, accord with the com-
mon law concept of gifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges,
and other dispositions of property for a consideration to the extent
that the value of the property transferred by the donor exceeds the
value in money or money's worth of the consideration given there-
for. However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made
in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide,
at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be con-
sidered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth.4
7
44. Id. at 528-29.
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2043(a) (estate tax), 2512 (gift tax). For
example, section 2043(a) provides: "If any one of the transfers, trusts, interests, rights
or powers enumerated and described in sections 2035 to 2048, inclusive, and section
2041 is made, created, exercised, or relinquished for a consideration in money or money's
worth, but is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, there shall be included in the gross estate only the excess of the fair
market value at the time of death of the property otherwise to be included on account of
such transaction, over the value of the consideration received therefore by the dece-
dent." (emphasis added). It would thus appear that if the transfer is a bona fide sale,
as that term is customarily used in the ordinary course of business, the property would
not be included in the transferor's estate. It is only transfers that lack the "arm's length"
nature of business transactions which would fall within the section.
46. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-8 (1958) (gift tax), 20.2043-1 (1958) (estate tax).
47. Id. § 25.2512-8 (emphasis added).
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It is now settled that the transfer of the widow's share of the com-
munity property to a trust established by her husband's will, under an
election situation involving California community property, is taxable as
a gift."' However, the gift is taxable only to the extent that the value of
the widow's community interest exceeds the present value of the right to
income from the entire community property in the trust; that is, only
the net amount relinquished by the widow is taxable as a gift." The
terms "consideration in money or money's worth" are found only in the
federal estate and gift tax provisions and have been explained by Pro-
fessor Lowndes as follows:
Consideration has a dual role under the estate and gift taxes. It
serves to prevent a double estate tax upon property transferred by a
decedent during his life and the consideration received in return for
the transfer. At the same time, by injecting the requirement of eco-
nomic equivalence into the common-law concept of consideration,
Congress has attempted to prevent taxpayers from depleting their
taxable estates by transfers for nominal consideration."0
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue. v. Siegel,51 a case de-
cided by the Ninth Circuit in 1957, the Commissioner had contended
that the widow's transfer to a trust under an election situation was an
independent gift and was thus fully taxable to her without allowance
for the value of the income she received from the entire community prop-
erty in the trust under the terms of her husband's will. The court held,
however, that the bequest to the widow and the transfer of her share of
the community property to the trust were in support of one another and
stated:
[T]he surrender by the taxpayer of her community property rights
was a gift to the estate to the extent that the value of the interest
thus surrendered exceeded the value of the interest she acquired
under the terms of the will. . . . What the taxpayer surrendered
was the consideration for what she received. 52
The Tax Court came to the same conclusion in another case,58 and
the Commissioner has now acquiesced in these decisions.54
The Gist court concluded that for purposes of the federal gift and
estate taxes the transfer of the widow's share of the community property
48. Commissioner v. Siegel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
49. Id.; accord, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(b); Treas. Reg. §' 25.2512-8
(1958).
50. Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 35 GEO.
WAsH. L REv. 50, 81 (1967); see Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945);
Haskins' Estate v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Cal. 1965), af 'd, 357 F.2d 492
(9th Cir. 1966).
51. 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1956), affg 26 T.C. 743 (1956).
52. 250 F.2d at 343.
53. Zilla Mae Turman, 35 T.C. 1123 (1961).
54. Rev. Rul. 64-2, 1964-2 CuM. BuLL. 7.
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to the trust constituted a "purchase" to the extent of the life interests she
received, and a gift of the difference between the value of the entire
property transferred and of the life interest received. This interpreta-
tion would not be inconsistent with the purpose55 of the federal gift
tax which is to impose an excise tax on transfers of wealth made dur-
ing the life of the donor, which might otherwise escape the estate tax
imposed upon transfers at death.5" The right to receive the life in-
come from the entire community property has a determinable value in
the hands of the widow, 57 and to the extent of such "retained" value
her estate has not been diminished and thus is not taxed as part of the
gift. In other words, such a divisible transaction (part purchase, part
gift) might be an appropriate interpretation for purposes of the federal
estate and gift taxes, since only the net amount of the gift is taxable in
any event.
However, to conclude that the "part purchase, part gift"58 inter-
pretation would be equally applicable for purposes of the federal income
tax, as was done by the court in the Gist case in allowing the widow
to amortize the "cost" of the life interest in the husband's share of the
community property, is not justified. Apparently disregarded by the
Gist court was the important distinction between a "bona fide, arm's
length" transaction which, of course, would not be subject to the gift
tax at all, and a "transfer for inadequate consideration" which is tax-
able as a gift, but only to the extent of the value relinquished by the
donor.59
The terms "consideration in money or money's worth" in the es-
tate and gift tax provisions are utilized only to determine the amount
of liability resulting from the transfer after it has been categorized as a
gift. Unless the transaction is categorized as a gift, the terms "consid-
eration in money or money's worth" are not applicable in any way. The
same transaction cannot be both a gift and a "bona fide, arm's length"
transaction since the latter is specifically excluded from the estate and
gift tax provisions. Amortization is an allowable deduction only in a
commercial setting and is not allowable for a gift transaction. A short
example might further clarify this point.
Suppose A owns property with a fair market value of $1000 and
55. For an excellent historical discussion of the federal gift tax, see Estate of San-
ford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 42-44 (1939). The gift tax provisions and the
estate tax provisions are to be read in pari materia. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S.
106 (1950).
56. INT. Rpv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001-209.
57. The "present values" of the life income and of the remainder interest are com-
puted by reference to actuarial tables as set forth in Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-7 (1958),
25.2512-5 (1958).
58. See text following note 54 supra.
59. See note 45 supra.
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in a bona fide, arm's length, commercial transaction he trades his prop-
erty for B's property which has a fair market value of only $600.
Would A be liable for the gift tax on the $400 he failed to receive as the
result of the poor business bargain entered into with B? No! It is only
when the entire transaction lacks the bona fide, arm's length character
of a commercial transaction that the gift tax would be imposed on the
$400 in the example above. Conversely, if the transaction is subject
to the gift tax because it is not a bona fide, arm's length transaction
(and the Gist court, by imposing the gift tax, has apparently concluded
that the widow's election constituted such a transaction), it is difficult
to perceive the justification for determining that there has been a bona
fide transaction for purposes of allowing an amortization deduction.
Another troublesome aspect of the court's application of the "part
purchase, part gift" rationale of the gift tax cases to the Gist case, is
that the widow was not allowed to amortize the entire amount exempted
from the gift tax-$144,179-as had been originally requested by the
widow. Instead, the court utilized a hybrid approach and allowed the
widow to amortize only the "cost" of acquiring the life income from
the husband's portion of the community property in the trust-$58,205.
Therefore, the court apparently did not completely follow the rationale
of the gift tax cases and did not explain this apparent inconsistency
other than to say that to allow the widow to amortize the entire
$144,179 would be to import "another legal fiction into the federal
tax laws." It appears that the "fictitious" characterization is equally
applicable to the court's decision allowing amortization of the $58,205.
It is extremely unfortunate that the court did not clearly explain the
basis for its conclusion.
Under the estate tax provisions, property transferred to a trust in
which the transferor retains a life interest is included in the gross estate
of the transferor at his death. 60 However, such transfers are not includ-
ible in the decedent's estate if there has been a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration.61
Since the widow in the Gist case retained the life interest 'in her
community property when it was transferred to the trust, her com-
munity property would be included in her estate at her death.6 How-
ever, only the excess of the fair market value of the property at the date
of her death over the value of the entire life income (including the life
income from the husband's share of the community property) when the
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036; Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (1958); see gen-
erally Vardell's Estate v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962).
61. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2043(a); Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1 (1958).
62. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036; Treas. Reg. 20.2036-1 (1958); see, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
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trust was first established would be included in her gross estate." The
same tax result is achieved whether the widow is deemed a "purchaser"
of one-half of the life income, or whether she is deemed not to have
transferred a portion of her community property to the trust equivalent
tothe value of the total life income she received for her life. 64
Thus, the term "consideration in money or money's worth" is ap-
plicable only insofar as the transaction is subject to the estate and gift
taxes. Consequently, the Gist court erred in its reliance on the estate
and gift tax cases to uphold its decision that the widow was a "pur-
chaser" for income tax purposes.65
The Widows's Election and the Federal Income Tax
The concept that a widow, by electing to transfer her share of com-
munity property to a trust named in the husband's will in order to take
her bequest under the will, might be considered a "purchaser" of the
interest she received had been considered by legal writers66 for a num-
ber of years prior to the Gist decision. However, the decision of the Su-
preme Court in a 1933 case, Helvering v. Butterworth,67 was generally
63. Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1 (1958) (estate tax) provides: "[Transfers are not
included in the gross estate of decedent if there was] a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth. To constitute a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, the transfer must have been
made in good faith, and the price must have been an adequate and full equivalent re-
ducible to a money value. If the price was less than such a consideration only the excess
of the fair market value of the property. . . over the price received by the decedent is in-
cluded in ascertaining the value of the gross estate."
64. See text following note 54 supra.
65. Professor Lowndes contends that transplantation of the contractual concept
of consideration into the area of federal estate and gift taxation does not promote satis-
factory solutions to estate and gift tax problems. Lowndes, Consideration and the
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 50 (1967). Consequently, it
would seem that an extension of the conceptual confusion from the federal estate and
gift tax area to the federal income tax area-the Gist situation-not only inherits the
difficulties of applying the concept of consideration to the estate and gift tax area, but
also dangerously increases the burden to be borne by such a conceptually unsound
foundation.
66. See articles cited note 6 supra. In many of the articles discussing the income
tax effects of the widow's election, the authors begin with the premise that the widow
should be or could be considered a "purchaser" for income tax purposes, and then dis-
cuss the availability of an amortization deduction for the "cost" of the life estate ac-
quired by the widow by virtue of her election to take under her husband's will. How-
ever, there is generally no case citation or other authority cited to substantiate the va-
lidity of the premise. For the scenario to the Gist case, for example, see The Measured
Voluntary Survivors Election: A Planning Technique for Both Separate Property and
Community Property Estates, 19 U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 549, 578 (1967).
67. 290 U.S. 365 (1933), affg 63 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1933), rev'g 23 B.T.A.
838 (1931).
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considered to have foreclosed the matter.68
In Butterworth, a widow had elected to take the income from a
trust established under her husband's will and had surrendered the
rights in her husband's estate granted her under Pennsylvania law. The
widow contended that by relinquishing her statutory rights in her hus-
band's estate, she had purchased an annuity and payments to her from
the trust were not subject to taxation until she recovered the value of
the statutory share she relinquished. Prior cases had allowed a widow
under similar circumstances to exclude trust distributions from her gross
income until such time as her "capital" investment had been recovered. 69
Relying on these decisions, the Commissioner refused to allow the trust
to deduct payments of trust income to the widow in computing the
taxable income of the trust.70 In the Butterworth case the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether the widow was to be treated as a
beneficiary or as a purchaser insofar as the distributions of trust income
were concerned. If the widow were a beneficiary, she would be re-
quired to include the trust income distributed to her in her gross in-
come and the trust would be allowed a deduction for such distribution
in computing its taxable income. If, on the other hand, the widow
were found to be a "bona fide purchaser" of an interest in the trust, the
distribution of trust income to the widow would not be deductible by
the trust. The Court stated as follows:
Is a widow who accepts the provisions of her husband's will and re-
ceives part or all of the income from an established trust in lieu of
her statutory rights a beneficiary within the ambit of the statute?
We think she is. It is unnecessary to discuss her rights or position
under other circumstances. We are dealing with a tax statute and
seeking to determine the will of Congress.
When she makes her election the widow decides to accept the
benefits of the will with the accompanying rights and liabilities. In
no proper sense does she purchase an annuity. For reasons satis-
68. See, e.g., Brookes, The Tax Consequences of Widows' Elections in Community
Property States, U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 83, 88-89 (1951).
69. United States v. Bolster, 26 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1928); accord, Allen v.
Brandeis, 29 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1928); Warner v. Walsh, 15 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1926).
In Bolster, the court stated: "By the General Laws of Massachusetts (Chapter 191, §
15), as well as under the earlier statutes, a surviving husband or wife may refuse to ac-
cept the provisions of a will and take his or her statutory share in the corpus of the estate
as if the deceased had died intestate. When the surviving husband or wife accepts the
provisions of the will, whether or not such provisions are expressly declared to be 'in lieu
of such statutory rights,' the survivor is in the position of one who sells property to the
estate, and acquires the legal status of 'a purchaser for a valuable consideration."' 26
F.2d at 761.
70. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 651-52 provide that a trust which distributes only
current income is allowed a deduction in computing its taxable income for distributions
of such income to beneficiaries; the beneficiaries are required to include the distribu-
tions in their gross income.
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factory to herself, she expresses a desire to occupy the position of
a beneficiary and we think she should be so treated. 71
In Gist,72 the district court distinguished Butterworth on the basis
that it did not deal with the issue of amortization and did not involve a
widow's rights in community property. 3 While it is true that there are
important differences in the rights of a widow in community property
as compared to a widow's statutory dower interest, it is also true that
the widow in Butterworth relinquished valuable vested rights when she
elected to take under her husband's will in lieu of her statutory interest
in her husband's estate. 74 The analogy between Butterworth and Gist
should therefore be clear. The Butterworth decision does not suggest
that the quantity or quality of the consideration relinquished by the
widow was the determining factor in the decision. Rather, the issue
was whether the widow's election to take under the will made her a
"purchaser" under the income tax laws relative to trust income, and the
Court held that she was a beneficiary. 75 The amortization deduction in
the Gist case, and the "return of capital" theory in the Butterworth case
would appear to have a similar bearing on the taxability of the trust in-
come to the widow: Whether the income was taxable to her would in
both cases depend primarily on whether she was deemed a "purchaser"
of her interest or had received her right to income under the trust as a
beneficiary. Under these circumstances, the holding in Butterworth
would appear to be fully applicable to the facts in the Gist case.
It should be pointed out that if the widow in the Gist case is
deemed to be a "purchaser" of the right to the income from the trust,
then the trust will not be entitled to a deduction for the distributions
of income to the widow in computing its taxable income. 76  Thus, the
entire trust income will be subject to the income tax.
In discussing the amortization deduction to be allowed the widow
in the Gist case, the district court stated:
It is now clear that a taxpayer who purchases a life estate may
amortize his cost over the period of the beneficiary's life expectancy
by ratable annual deductions. . . . (Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d
253 (7th Cir. 1954); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fry,
71. 290 U.S. 365, at 369-70.
72. 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1969), af 'd, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970).
73. 296 F. Supp. at 529.
74. "Under the statutes of Pennsylvania a surviving spouse may elect to take
either under or against the will. Election to take under the will bars the right of the sur-
vivor to dower or any statutory interest in the estate of the decedent. Sec. 8335 et. seq.,
Penna. Stat. 1920); Purdon's Penna. Stat. Title 20, § 261." 23 B.T.A. 838, 839-40
(1931), rev'd on other grounds, 63 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd, 290 U.S. 365
(1933).
75. Text accompanying note 9 supra.
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 651-52.
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283 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1960).) The fact that the life estate here
was created upon the exercise of the widow's election does not
alter the fact that plaintiff may be a purchaser for value as would
be one to whom she sold her life estate for cash.77
Why the court deemed the Bell and Fry cases78 significant under
the circumstances in the Gist case is not entirely clear, since the pri-
mary issue in these two cases was not whether the taxpayer was a
purchaser, but whether a remainderman who purchases the intervening
life interests will be allowed to recover his cost by ratable annual
amortization deductions or will only be allowed to adjust the basis
of the property received so as to recoup his cost at the time of sale
or other disposition of the property. The Commissioner has now
agreed to allow the remainderman under these circumstances to re-
cover his cost by amortization.7 9
The contrast between the facts in the Bell and Fry cases8" and
in the Gist case is so striking that it can fairly be said the court was at-
tempting to fit square pegs into round holes. In the Bell8' case, for
example, the court noted that the remainderman had paid for the "full
and fair value" of the life estates, measured by the life expectancies of
the respective sellers, and stated:
In other words, if these life interests had been purchased by a third
party, there would be no question but that such party would be en-
titled to amortization. 82 ,
There would also be no question that a third party paying the "full
and fair value" of the life estate of the widow in the Gist case would be
entitled to recover such cost over the remaining life of the widow, and
this would be true even though the widow had acquired her life estate
by inheritance, bequest, or devise. However, the issue in the Gist case
was not whether a purchased life estate can be amortized; it was
whether the widow can be termed a purchaser by virtue of her election
to be a beneficiary under her husband's will. Unless the widow is
deemed to be a purchaser the issue of amortization is never reached.
The court's reliance on the cases involving the effect of the widow's
election for federal estate and gift tax purposes in concluding that the
widow was a purchaser has been previously discussed 3 and will not be
repeated here. However, it should be pointed out that the gift and es-
77. 296 F. Supp. 526, 528 (S.D. Cal. 1969) (emphasis added).
78. See note 10 supra.
79. Rev. Rul. 132, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 73.
80. See note 10 supra.
81. Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954).
82. Id. at 254.
83. See text following note 44 supra.
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tate tax statutes have been held not to be controlling for income tax pur-
poses.84
As a sidelight, it may be pointed out that if the widow is treated
as a purchaser under the circumstances in the Gist case, she may be
subject to a taxable capital gain on the exchange to the extent that the
value of the life estate received exceeds the value of the remainder in-
terest "sold."85  Similarly, to the extent that her share of the com-
munity property exceeds the value of the life interest she receives in
her husband's share, his estate would realize taxable gain. Since the
widow receives a "stepped up" basis for her share of the community
property upon the death of her husband,86 the possibility is remote
that the value of the life estate in the husband's share of the community
property will ever exceed the value of the widow's share of the com-
munity property transferred to the trust so as to give rise to taxable
gain on the exchange.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Gist v. United States87 that the
widow's election constituted a "purchase" of the life estate in her hus-
band's share of the community property, and that her cost could thus
be amortized over her expected life, appears unsound under both Cali-
fornia law and federal income tax law. The decision incorporates an-
other legal fiction into the already burdened federal tax laws, and
though the tax reduction motives may be laudable, it would not appear
to be in the public interest to allow California widows an unequal tax
benefit on the basis of a contrived distinction in the California com-
munity property laws. Under the Gist holding, the widow's election
in California results in a "purchase," the cost of which can be amortized
by ratable deductions against the trust income received. The widow's
election in a non-community property jurisdiction would not appear to
provide a similar benefit because of the Butterworth decision.
Therefore, even though the substance of the transaction is the same
in both instances-a relinquishment of concededly valuable rights in
property in order to receive a bequest under the decedent husband's
will-the California widow is allowed an income tax advantage not
available to the other widow. The Gist decision was apparently based
on an incorrect analogy to the gift tax cases, and careful reconsidera-
84. See, e.g., Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir.
1947); Gump v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1941).
85. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1014(a), 1014(b)(g), 1201(b).
86. Id. § 1014(b)(g).
87. 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'g 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1969).
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tion of the problem would appear to be in order when future cases
(which are now sure to arise) come before the court.
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